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 ?dƌĞĂƐƵƌǇŽŶƚƌŽů ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂů^ƚĂƚĞ 
The Political Economy of Green Development Strategy in UK Central Government 
 
Martin P.A. Craig 
Sheffield Political Economy Research Institute 
 
 “dƌĞĂƐƵƌǇĐŽŶƚƌŽůŝƐƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚǇŽƵůŝǀĞƵŶĚĞƌ ?ƚŚĂƚǇŽƵƐƵĨĨĞƌĨƌŽŵ ?ƚŚĂƚǇŽƵƉƌŽĨŝƚďǇ ?ĂŶĚŝĨǇŽƵ
cannot define it, well  W Lord Morley used to say that he could not define an elephant, but he knew it 
when he saw it, and you know Treasury control wheŶǇŽƵĨĞĞůŝƚ ? ? 
H. Higgs, 1924, p.122 
 
 
Abstract 
ŐƌŽǁŝŶŐůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞƵƐĞƐƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂůƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƚŽƌĞĨĞƌƚŽƚŚĞŶĞǁƌŽůĞƐĂŶĚŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů
capacities that the modern capitalist state has acquired in relation to the environment and the 
unfolding ecological crisis. Green development strategies for the transformation of unsustainable 
accumulation models are an important qualitative and quantitative indicator of environmental 
statehood. Yet in Britain, the powers and policy priorities of H.M Treasury are proving a significant 
ĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶƚ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ƐƵĐŚĂ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ? / ƐŝƚƵĂƚĞ ƚŚĞdƌĞĂƐƵƌǇ ?ƐŽďƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀĞ ƐƚĂŶĐĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ
broader history of the internal politics of the British state, arguing that it reflects a long-standing 
tendency for the Treasury to assert a position of power vis-à-vis departmental rivals in ways that 
undermine their capacity to conduct interventionist industrial policies. I analyse the post-2008 context 
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as a moment in which this regularity has re-asserted itself as the Treasury privileges a strategy of 
accumulation model repair over one of transformation. I illustrate the implications of this stance for 
the emerging British environmental state by examining two episodes: the containment and 
privatisation of the green investment bank, and recent incursions by the Treasury into energy policy. 
I conclude by considering the methodological and practical implications of the analysis. 
 
Introduction 
In recent years tŚĞƌĞ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ Ă ƌĞƐƵƌŐĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ŝŶ  ‘ƚŚĞ ƐƚĂƚĞ ? ĂŵŽŶŐƐƚ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌs of 
environmental politics. A growing literature conceptualises, charts, compares and typologises a new 
aspect of the modern state  W the  ‘ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶ1tal ƐƚĂƚĞ ? Wsaid to have emerged as it has acquired new 
roles and institutional capacities in relation to the environment and the unfolding ecological crisis 
(Barry and Eckersley, 2005; Bäckstrand and Kronsell, 2015; Duit, 2014, Duit, Feindt and Meadowcroft, 
2016; Paterson, 2016). The prefixing of  ‘environmental ? ƚŽ  ‘ƐƚĂƚĞ ? ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĞƐ Ă ŶĞǁ ƐĞƚ ŽĨ ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ
alongside previous ones cumulatively acquired by the modern state, each of which are signified by 
their own prefixes:  ‘ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇƐƚĂƚĞ ? ? ‘prosperity ?Žƌ ‘ĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐƚ ? state, ĂŶĚ ‘ǁĞůĨĂƌĞƐƚĂƚĞ ? ?Meadowcroft, 
2012). In this respect, the environmental state represents the intersection of the modern ƐƚĂƚĞ ?Ɛ
environmental functions and policies with its existing social, security and economic ones. It is the 
ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƐƚĂƚĞŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐ ?ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐƚŽƌĞĐŽŶĐŝůĞ or trade-off the goals associated with 
each in the exercise of state power. 
The environmental state literature highlights the continuing relevance of a long-established object of 
political inquiry: the application of state power in domestic affairs for public purposes, and the factors 
that shape whether and how it is so applied. In the context of the unfolding ecological crisis and its 
                                                          
1 The author would like to express his thanks  W with the usual disclaimers  W to Tom Hunt, Tony Payne, Craig 
Berry, Dan Bailey, Colin Thain, Catherine Walsh, David Coates, David Powell, Dan Corry, Michael Jacobs and 
Robyn Eckersley for their advice, encouragement and comments on earlier drafts of this article, as well as to 
the reviewers for their helpful comments. 
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related looming catastrophes, a key public purpose embodied by the environmental state is green 
economic transformation: rapidly reducing the environmental impacts of the model of capital 
accumulation within ƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?Ɛ jurisdiction.i I refer to the expression of this purpose in public policy 
 ‘ŐƌĞĞŶĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ? ? 
Much of the environmental state literature emphasises international comparisons and 
generalisations, with researchers frequently devoting their efforts to constructing ideal-typical 
typologies of different kinds of environmental state (for instance Duit, 2016; Sommerer and Lim, 2016; 
Christoff, 2005). Yet the environmental state concept has great potential as a tool through which to 
describe and analyse the domestic political economies of green development strategy in individual 
countries. I adopt such a perspective in this paper so as to examine the emergence of the British 
environmental state in its unique historical and political-economic context and identify certain 
contextually-specific barriers that are obstructing its capacity to deliver green development strategy.  
My argument concerns the organisation of the British state and how this sustains ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛ 
ecologically unsustainable and financialised accumulation model (Davis and Walsh, 2015). Significant 
direct and indirect powers are concentrated into a single government department  W H.M. Treasury, 
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐũŽŝŶƚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂŶĚĨŝŶĂŶĐĞŵŝŶŝƐƚƌǇ. These add up to a tendential predominance in matters 
of policy formation in and beyond economic policy, known colloquially among British officials as 
 ‘dƌĞĂƐƵƌǇĐŽŶƚƌŽů ? ?,ĂĚĚŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ ?ĂƐĞƚŽĨŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůůǇĞŶĚƵƌŝŶŐƉŽůŝĐǇƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝĞƐcontinue 
to pattern the exercise of Treasury control  W priorities that have historically reinforced the 
ƉƌĞĚŽŵŝŶĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ ĐŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂů ĨŝŶĂŶĐĞ ĐĂƉŝƚĂů ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛ ĂĐĐƵŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ŵŽĚĞů ? ĂŶĚ ǁŚŝĐŚare  
antithetical to the emergence of a green development strategy able to transform ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛ
capitalist model. The Treasury has historically demonstrated an obstructive and often hostile stance 
towards the kinds of transformative and production-oriented industrial policies that green 
development strategy implies (Ingham, 1984). During moments of economic crisis, it has exercised 
control over nascent initiatives of this nature by other government departments, sacrificing them to 
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ƚŚĞ ŐŽĂů ŽĨ ƌĞƉĂŝƌŝŶŐ  ?ǁŝƚŚ ĂƐ ĨĞǁ ĂĚĂƉƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĂƐ ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ?ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛ ĨŝŶĂŶĐĞ-dominated 
accumulation model. The pattern is witnessed in the post-2008 context, as it has been throughout the 
peacetime politics of the 20th century.  
The twofold result is that commercial financial capital continues to be privileged in economic policy, 
whilst the British state fails to develop the kinds of institutional capacities necessary to deliver a 
transformative development strategy (green or otherwise) able to rejuvenate the productive 
economy. This is not to say that Treasury control alone explains the setting of economic policy 
objectives  W the priorities of prime ministers, party factions, electoral coalitions and the myriad 
interest groups that comprise the British political economy all playa role, as do international political-
economic forces. Nor is the Treasury control an invariant or omnipotent force, as the divisions over 
Brexit in the current government amply demonstrate. Yet such political-economic forces are refracted 
through the prism of the Treasury, which occupies a uniquely powerful position in the setting of British 
economic policy. For this reason, my overarching contention is that a better understanding of the 
mechanisms and directing factors underpinning Treasury control represents a vital intellectual 
objective for those studying the emerging British environmental state. It is by understanding such 
factors that conditions favouring a more positive role for the Treasury could be identified and debated. 
In the first two sections I lay out the academic and historical context for my argument, situating it 
amongst literatures on the environmental state, industrial strategy and British political economy. In 
the third section I examine evidence of how Treasury control is negatively impacting upon the 
emerging landscape of green development strategy in Britain. In the concluding section I draw out 
some of the implications of the argument for the environmental state literature and debates over 
state reform in Britain.  
 
The Capitalist Environmental State and Green Development Strategy 
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The environmental state concept has emerged amidst a broader rediscovery of state power amongst 
researchers of environmental politics with diverse interests and perspectives. This rediscovery is likely 
driven by the diminishing timescales within which expansive symptoms of ecological crisis like global 
warming and biodiversity loss must be addressed, the lacklustre performance of existing experiments 
in  ‘market environmentalism ?, and the as yet uncertain impact of hybrid and/or voluntary 
 ‘ƚƌĂŶƐŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐůŝŵĂƚĞĐŚĂŶŐĞŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ?ŽŶĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞntal outcomes. Yet an unfortunate result (at 
least from the point of view of the non-specialist approaching these literatures) is the resulting array 
of similar-sounding but only partially overlapping conceptual adjectives appended to the concept of 
 ‘ƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞ ? ?ŵŽŶŐƚŚĞŵĂƌĞƚŚĞ ‘green state ? (an increasingly refined normative ideal prescribing the 
form that a state might take in in a truly ecologically sustainable social model, on which see Eckersley, 
2004; Christoff, 2005; and Bailey, this issue) and the  ‘environmental state ? (an analytical category 
describing how modern states are changing as a result of the acquisition of environmental 
responsibilities and functions). 
These developments in the field of environmental politics parallel a similar rediscovery of state power 
among economists and policymakers. Industrial policy (defined here as purposefully coordinated 
policy interventions aimed at shaping the trajectory of economic development in pursuit of public 
purposes) is once more on the mainstream academic and policy agenda after decades of neglect 
(Mazzucato, 2013; Rodrik, 2010; Wade, 2012; Aiginger, 2014; Craig, 2015a; Berry, 2016). This 
rediscovery also reflects the failure of market-led development to deliver acceptable outcomes in an 
acceptable timeframe, namely the re-establishment of stable accumulation models able to deliver 
publicly acceptable rates of income and employment in the staid economic circumstances of the post-
2008 context. 
This distinct agenda underlines an important point: environmental states do not emerge in a historical 
vacuum. They develop in the context of pre-existing functions acquired by modern states, and in all 
but a few outlying cases modern states are capitalist states: they are enmeshed in, and dependent in 
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multiple ways upon, a model of capital accumulation in their jurisdiction which their personnel 
attempt to administer through public policy. This imperative to facilitate capital accumulation arises 
because societies hosting capitalist political economies are dependent for income upon successful 
capital accumulation, whether it be directly (through individual participation in capitalist labour, 
product or asset markets) or indirectly (through public redistribution of private profits and incomes).  
Viewed thus, the environmental state marks the intersection of the ĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐƚƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ
and social responsibilities, functions and policies with its more recently acquired environmental ones: 
it is the site upon which trade-offs and/or synergies between them are fashioned. The tension 
necessitating these trade-offs and/or synergies arises because those accumulation models able to 
support publicly acceptable levels of income have entailed economic growth, and such growth 
remains directly or indirectly  ‘ĐŽƵƉůĞĚ ?ƚŽĂƌĂŶŐĞŽĨŐƌŽǁŝŶŐĞĐŽůŽŐŝĐĂůimpacts (Craig, 2017). To be 
sure, certain countries can demonstrate improvements in certain ecological impacts of their domestic 
productive sectors, however this has often been achieved by simply importing those products 
associated with ecological degradation from other countries. In this sense, their accumulation models 
are no less dependent upon (or implicated in) ecologically degrading production practices. 
Consequently, a capitalist environmental state is one that  W amongst other things  W  is orientated to 
the managing these tensions and trade-offs through public policy whilst allowing economic growth to 
proceed.  
The way in which economic, social and environmental policy trade-offs are managed is an important 
qualitative indicator of the form of a given environmental state. In principle, the management of 
trade-offs could entail only the cleaning up of pollution after the event. However, as the scale and 
scope of ecological crisis has been increasingly acknowledged by policymakers, environmental and 
economic policies have become increasingly integrated around the goal of reducing the direct and 
indirect contributions made by domestic production and consumption to symptoms of the crisis such 
as global warming and biodiversity loss. This stance (however ineffectively or half-heartedly it is 
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pursued in practice) implies the state-facilitated transformation of accumulation models so that they 
become capable of generatŝŶŐ  ‘ŐƌĞĞŶĞƌ ? growth and accumulation whilst minimising the negative 
impacts on of social policy goals. 
Such a transformative stance amounts to a form of strategic  ‘ŐƌĞĞŶ industrial policy ?, embodying 
purposefully coordinated state interventions in the productive economy intended. Policies ranging 
from subsidies for renewable energy production to grants for electric car battery research can be 
captured under this heading. zĞƚ ƚŚĞ ƚĞĐŚŶŽĐƌĂƚŝĐ ŚƵĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ  ‘ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůƉŽůŝĐǇ ?inadequately 
captures the ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂůƐƚĂƚĞ ?Ɛintegration of multiple public purposes. Hence, I prefer the term 
 ‘green development strategy ?  W  ‘ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ? ŝŵƉůǇŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƐƚĂƚĞ ?Ɛsocial as well as capital 
accumulatory objectives ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ?ŝŵƉůǇŝŶŐƉƵƌƉŽƐĞĨƵůŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ? 
Precisely what green development strategy entails in practice is much debated: space here permits 
discussion of only the broadest contours. The rediscovery of industrial policy in economic and policy 
thought centres on the notion that policymakers can and should intervene to bring about a trajectory 
of industrial development that reflects public purposes, catalysing both public and private investment 
in the productive economy in order to bring about the development and growth of technologies and 
sectors related to those purposes (Mazucato, 2013; Rodrik, 2010; 2014). In the absence of this 
strategic and developmental role, the argument holds that such public purposes would simply not be 
achieved by market-led development alone. In the case of achieving a greener model of capital 
accumulation, this is to say that a market-led process of investment and industrial development would 
see an insufficient scale of investment allocated to the development and deployment of green 
technologies and the growth of related green sectors. 
The means by which this strategic and developmental role could be accomplished in practice ranges 
from simple policy incentives (carbon prices, environmental taxes, and so on) to direct investment by 
public agencies. The economic orthodoxy holds the latter appropriate when  ‘ŵĂƌŬĞƚĨĂŝůƵƌĞƐ ?ŝŵƉĞĚĞ
private allocation of capital on the necessary scale within an acceptable timeframe (Rodrik, 2014). 
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What constitutes  ‘ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ĂĐĐĞƉƚĂďůĞ ? ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚis a deeply political matter, as 
environmentalist critics of cost-benefit analysis have long observed (Ackerman, 2008). Yet in the 
specific case of carbon emissions, a consensus exists between the major British political parties that 
an 80% reduction on 1990s emissions constitutes the necessary action, and that the acceptable 
timeframe to accomplish it runs to 2050. In light of this target, there has been acknowledgement by a 
range of interests within and beyond government that public leadership in the allocation of 
investment is required to accomplish a sufficient scale of investment (Holmes and Mabey, 2010; H.M. 
Government, 2011; TUC, 2014a).  
The public allocation of capital in the productive economy implies the creation of institutions allowing 
the identification of investment opportunities, the allocation of capital, and the avoidance of capture 
by particular industries. Publicly owned investment banks have recently received renewed attention 
as a possible means by which such institutions could manifest in practice (Mazzucato and Penna, 2015; 
Holmes and Mabey, 2010; OECD, 2017). Yet despite public investment banks being a common feature 
of comparable advanced capitalist political economies, no such institution exists in Britain. Meanwhile, 
alternative mechanisms for delivering development strategy (green or otherwise) do not command 
comparable quantities of capital. As the following two sections show, this under-development of 
industrial policy capacities is no coincidence: it reflects historical trends in the British political economy 
centring upon the powers and priorities of the Treasury. 
 
The British Post-2008 Context 
Various distinctive accumulation models have prevailed in Britain over the course of the past century 
and a half, but with the exception of certain historically anomalous moments (namely, during the two 
world wars) they have had an important commonality: commercial finance has been the lead sector 
and has been systematically privileged in the exercise of state power (Ingham, 1984). Meanwhile, 
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domestic civilian productive sectors (that is, those producing non-military goods and services) have 
featured less prominently in the priorities of economic policymakers.  
The paucity of civilian industrial policy is a ĨĂĐƚŽƌ ĨƌĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ ŝŶǀŽŬĞĚ ƚŽ ĞǆƉůĂŝŶ ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞ
manufacturing underperformance in comparison with other advanced capitalist economies over the 
20th century (Berry, 2015). By contrast, at times of economic crisis the British state has routinely 
adopted economic policy positions that have reinforced the centrality of commercial financial 
businesses to its accumulation model. Historically, this has often taken the form of policies to maintain 
exchange rate commitments (the gold standard, and then the Bretton Woods system) through 
domestic deflation (Ingham, 1984; Silverwood, 2016) ?dŚƵƐ ? ŝŶƐŽĨĂƌĂƐĂ  ‘ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚĂů ƐƚĂƚĞ ?ŚĂƐ
taken shape in Britain, it has been one predominantly oriented to creating and defending the 
conditions for the prosperity of the City of London, rather than supporting the development and 
modernisation of the productive economy (Lee, 2010). At times of economic crisis, the latter goal has 
been subordinated to the former. 
&ŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĚŝƐŽƌĚĞƌůǇĞǆŝƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶǆĐŚĂŶŐĞZĂƚĞDĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵŝŶ ? ? ? ?ĂƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨ
contingent developments facilitated the emergence of a new accumulation model, which Hay (2011) 
terms the  ‘ŶŐůŽ-ůŝďĞƌĂůŐƌŽǁƚŚŵŽĚĞů ?. As with its predecessors, commercial finance is at its core. Yet 
a number of features combine to make it distinct. First, growth is powered by domestic demand driven 
ďǇĐƌĞĚŝƚƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĞĂƌŶĞĚŝŶĐŽŵĞ ?ŝƌŽŶŝĐĂůůǇƐƵŵŵĞĚƵƉĂƐ ‘ŚŽƵƐĞ ƉƌŝĐĞ<ĞǇŶĞƐŝĂŶŝƐŵ ?ďǇtĂƚƐŽŶ
[2010], in reference to the role played by home equity release in bolstering aggregate demand within 
the model). This offset a stagnating picture of real wage growth (TUC, 2014b). Secondly, prior to 2008 
regional disparities in employment arising from a rapid pace of manufacturing decline were offset to 
a degree by public sector expansion, in part facilitated by tax receipts from the profitable financial 
sector. Third, the financial business strategies that underpinned the previously mentioned drivers of 
growth and employment channelled capital into residential and commercial property lending in a bid 
to meet capital market demands for shareholder value, and were increasingly centred upon the 
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generation of transaction fees rather than holding assets to maturity (Engelen et al., 2012). The result 
played no small part in the build-up of systemic risk that gave rise to the global financial crash of 2008, 
ƚŽǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞŵŽĚĞů ?ƐƌĞůŝĂŶĐĞŽŶ financial sector profitability left Britain particularly exposed.  
In the intervening years  ?ƚŚĞ ‘ƉŽƐƚ- ? ? ? ?ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ? ?successive governments have attempted to repair 
this accumulation model with minimal adaptations, instead shoring up the conditions for credit-driven 
expansion through policies intended to preserve asset prices and encourage consumer lending. These 
include a suite of unconventional monetary policies and housing market interventions, such as 
 ‘ƋƵĂŶƚŝƚĂƚŝǀĞĞĂƐŝŶŐ ? ? ‘ĐƌĞĚŝƚĞĂƐŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘ŚĞůƉƚŽďƵǇ ?ƐĐŚĞŵĞ ?They have also done little to stem 
the wage-deflationary adjustment which followed the financial crisis, and have arguably stoked it 
through the constraint of government spending and reforms to the labour market and social security. 
The shifting of the burden of adjustment away from the asset-rich onto those reliant upon wage 
income, transfer payments and public services has earned the strategy the apt ŶĂŵĞŽĨ  ‘ƌĞĐŽǀĞƌǇ
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƌĞŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞƌĞĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ ? ?'ƌĞĞŶĂŶĚ>ĂǀĞƌǇ ? ?  ? ? ?^ ƵƉƉŽƌƚƚŽŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ?ŵĞĂŶǁŚŝůĞ ?ŚĂƐďĞĞŶ
a persistent target for fiscal consolidation (Craig, 2015b). 
Between 2013 and the 2016 EU referendum result British politicians took to speaking about the 
economy as though a recovery had been achieved. In reality, the British economy was in a far from 
normal or politically sustainable state: interest rates remained at the historically low 0.5%, unorthodox 
monetary instruments continued to be deployed, a reduction in real wages of historical proportions 
was (temporarily) curtailed only by the crash in oil prices in 2014, and major public services entered a 
period of financial collapse. In many senses, the resumed narrative of crisis in the wake of the EU 
referendum is better considered as a new phase in a prolonged crisis conjuncture: it is far from clear 
that the dissatisfaction felt by the electorate with pre-referendum institutional arrangements could 
be separated from these broader issues (an impression only bolstered by the outcome of the general 
election of June 2017). This is not the place to disentangle these factors, however it is upon this basis 
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that I refer to the entire post-2008 context as an ongoing period of political and economic  W as well as 
ecological  W crisis. 
 
 ?dƌĞĂƐƵƌǇŽŶƚƌŽů ? 
Recovery through regressive redistribution parallels the macroeconomic stances historically executed 
by British governments at times of economic crisis by privileging the profitability of commercial 
financial businesses and reinforcing their centrality to the accumulation model (Ingham, 1984). It does 
so by prioritising the support of asset prices whilst undermining the financial basis on which a project 
of state-facilitated accumulation model transformation would depend. In this respect, it is about 
accumulation model repair rather than accumulation model transformation. Green development 
strategy, by contrast, implies the displacement of this reparative tendency and its replacement with a 
transformative stance. Given the abiding nature of the regularity, it is useful to approach it through a 
historical perspective and to consider enduring factors in the organisation of political-economic life in 
the UK, as well as those that are specific to the post-2008 context. The focus of this paper is on one 
particular factor that has proven particularly prejudicial to the development of the kind of 
interventionist capacities that green development strategy entails: the constitution of the British state 
itself, the resulting distribution of power and resources amongst the different power centres therein, 
ĂŶĚƚŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘dƌĞĂƐƵƌǇcŽŶƚƌŽů ?ƚŽǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞǇŐŝǀĞƌŝƐĞ.  
It has been said that the British executive parallels a mediaeval barony: different ministries hold a high 
degree of operational autonomy from one another, whilst the head of government (the prime 
minister) has only a sparse and often blunt set of coordinating institutions through which to impose 
their will (Wilkes and Westlake, 2014; Corry, 2011). Capturing this reality entails a turn away from the 
convenient but ultimately obscuring tendency to analyse politics through the supposedly unified 
agendas of successive governments, and instead looks to the histories of the different departments 
and agencies that comprise the state. It asks how these histories shape, enable and constrain their 
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ƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞů ?Ɛ ?ŽĨƚĞŶĐŽŵƉĞƚŝŶŐ ?ŵĂŶĚĂƚĞƐ ?ƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝĞƐĂŶĚǁĂǇƐŽĨƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ in successive conjunctures, 
and how these militate against the kind of transformational stance and capacities that a green 
development strategy implies. Yet if British government departments enjoy a degree of autonomy 
from one another and from the centre, they are not all equally endowed in this respect: the direct and 
indirect power and influence of the Treasury  W ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ũŽŝŶƚ ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐ ĂŶĚ ĨŝŶĂŶĐĞ ŵŝŶŝƐƚƌǇ  W
pervades government, with far-reaching consequences for the development of policy and the 
institutions of economic governance (Kerslake, 2017; Environment Audit Committee, 2016b; Wilkes 
and Westlake, 2014).  
Throughout this paper, I use the term  ‘dƌĞĂƐƵƌǇĐŽŶƚƌŽů ? to signify an enduring tendency on the part of 
Treasury personnel to construct, maintain and defend a privileged position of power vis-à-vis other 
government departments so as to pursue Treasury policy priorities. This is a more encompassing notion 
than the merely quantitative financial procedures with which it is often associated, instead recovering 
the intra-state politics that earlier users associated with the term (e.g. Higgs, 1924). Yet the 
mechanisms through which it manifests in practice are very much rĞůĂƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞdƌĞĂƐƵƌǇ ?ƐŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐally 
accumulated powers to monitor and regulate public spending, which grant it an unparalleled ability 
to shape the priorities of other departments. During periodic comprehensive spending reviews the 
Chancellor caps the financial resources that each minister will have to pursue their policy brief over 
the review period, and then determines what additional resources will be available at each biannual 
budget. Beyond this, Treasury spending teams in each department monitor, and are required to sign 
off on, significant departmental spending projects. The Treasury-authored Green Book stipulates the 
terms according to which cost-benefit analyses may be conducted by public sector bodies when 
assessing spending projects. The Chief Secretary to the Treasury attends all cabinet committees (the 
nominal sites of cross-departmental projects and decisions-making) with a brief to assert Treasury 
priorities and oppose projects judged likely to become resource intensive (Corry, 2011). As this non-
exhaustive list demonstrates, the influence of the Treasury penetrates far into government.  
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Treasury control is not a straight-ĨŽƌǁĂƌĚ  ‘ǀĞƚŽƉŽŝŶƚ ?Žƌan invariant factor in British politics: it is 
continually defended and accomplished anew by Treasury personnel in the face of changing political 
and economic circumstances that sometimes bolster the ability of forces within and beyond the state 
to resist its policy priorities. (Ingham, 1984; Thain, 1984). Peacetime challenges have included 
reforming Prime Ministers; a trade union movement that has at times succeeded in resisting 
macroeconomic policy decisions (particularly throughout the 1970s); and, not least, the need of 
chancellors to factor the priorities of the electorate into their decision-making. In this respect, 
Treasury control ebbs and flows, and the relative power and influence of broader political-economic 
forces must always be taken into account. Yet the Treasury has proven adept at navigating these 
challenges and reasserting control, particularly at moments of economic crisis. At such moments, 
Treasury control is pivotal to explaining the tendency of British governments to favour accumulation 
model repair over transformation.  
Any project of accumulation model transformation articulated through the British state risks 
encountering Treasury resistance. The Treasury takes an ambivalent and often obstructive stance 
towards attempts by other departments to build the necessary capacities within the British state for 
intervention and modernisation of the civilian manufacturing sector. At moments of crisis this 
ambivalence has turned to hostility, with the Treasury imposing  ‘ĂƵƐƚĞƌŝƚǇ ?recovery strategies that 
have undermined the viability of such institutions or the finance necessary for their effectiveness. 
These recovery strategies tend in turn to favour the profitability of commercial financial businesses 
and reinforce their centrality to the British accumulation model. This dynamic can be seen at several 
important moments in the 20th century. A pivotal case is that of the short-ůŝǀĞĚ  ‘ĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ
ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĨĨĂŝƌƐ ? (DEA). The department, established to oversee the mid- ? ? ? ?Ɛ>ĂďŽƵƌŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ 
national plan of industrial modernisation, floundered on the deflationary macroeconomic stance 
imposed by a sceptical Treasury in response to the 1967 Sterling crisis (Ingham, 1984). In the years 
between 1979 and 2007 there was an alignment in the policy priorities of the much-reduced industry 
ministry and the Treasury, with both advocating a minimalist form of industrial policy that eschewed 
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large-scale public investment. This reflected the empowerment of the Treasury under Thatcherite 
economic policy doctrines, and the importation to the industry ministry of sympathetic ministers 
under the Thatcher government (Davis and Walsh, 2015). The post- 2008 context, by contrast, has 
witnessed an attempt by the industry ministries of two post-2008 governments (those of Gordon 
Brown and David Cameron) to fashion a more substantial industrial policy agenda (Craig, 2015a; 
2015b ? ?zĞƚ ƚŚĞŶĂƐĐĞŶƚĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐǁĞƌĞŚĞĂǀŝůǇƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶĞĚďǇƚŚĞdƌĞĂƐƵƌǇ ?ƐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇŽĨ ƌĞĐŽǀery 
through regressive redistribution. The department saw its expenditure limits reduced by 30% in the 
2010 spending review and by a further 6% in the 2013 spending review (Ibid, 2015). The department 
ĂůƐŽĐĞĚĞĚĂƌŽƵŶĚ  ?A?ŽĨ ŝƚƐďƵĚŐĞƚĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐǇďƵĚŐĞƚ ?ŽĨ  ? ? ? ? ?DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ ? ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ
innovations in green development strategy at this time have been subject to a similar treatment, as 
the next section lays out in detail. 
The notion of Treasury control invites the question of what the Treasury ?Ɛ priorities actually are. In 
response, it is common to recourse to ƚŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ ‘dƌĞĂƐƵƌǇǀŝĞǁ ?: an enduring set of priorities 
said to ƐŚĂƉĞƚŚĞĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?s outlook and agenda when interacting with other departments. In a 
historically rich account, Geoffrey Ingham (1984) suggests that throughout the latter 19th and 20th 
centuries the modern Treasury inherited a tradition of thought and practice from the liberal reformers 
of the 18th and 19th century, who sought to challenge aristocratic patronage inside and beyond the 
state. This, he argues, has led the Treasury to consistently champion a liberal economic order at home 
and abroad, and to regard other government departments as suspect and vulnerable to the capture 
by special interests. This in turn is held to explain the dƌĞĂƐƵƌǇ ?Ɛ ĚŝƐŝŶĐůŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ĨŝŶĂŶĐĞ
transformative industrial modernisation or sanction the development of this capacity in other 
departments, as well as its tendency to impose deflationary responses to economic crisis. Crucially, 
the tendency for Treasury priorities to benefit the commercial financial sector is cast as a by-product 
rather than an intended effect: deflationary recovery strategies are pursued because they fulfil the 
Treasury ?Ɛ own policy priorities and increase its relative position of control within government, not 
because of any direct capture of the department by the financial sector.  
15 
 
It is perhaps more accurate to think of the Treasury view as an enduring set of themes rather than an 
unchanging or monolithic body of thought and policy (Thain, 1984).ii Yet when comparing the 
arguments of a recent permanent secretary to those expressed by Treasury personnel in the 19th and 
20th century, one is struck by the enduring similarities (cf. Macpherson, 2014, Ingham, 1984, see 
Silverwood, 2017, for an extended discussion). An abstraction of these themes might go thus: (1) a 
scepticism regarding the ability of targeted public investment to achieve positive economic effects, 
leading to a generally accepting attitude towards market allocations of economic resources; (2) a 
scepticism of the ability of broader government to control spending, leading to a preoccupation with 
cost management, and (3) a preoccupation with a relatively narrow range of macroeconomic 
indicators and their assumed relationships, leading to an emphasis on immediate GDP growth over 
consideration of the long-term merits of particular developmental paths. Together, these aspects of 
the Treasury view reinforce a common outcome with deeply negative implications from the point of 
view of green development strategy: the Treasury concerns itself with the cost-efficient management 
(and, if necessary, repair) of the accumulation model immediately in front of it, rather than with 
orientating economic policy towards a long-term project of accumulation model transformation. In 
short, it eschews transformative development strategy. 
This claim constitutes the basis of the most common critique made of the Treasury within and beyond 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĨŽƌŽǀĞƌĂĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ PƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐĞǆĐĞƐƐŝǀĞůǇ ‘ƐŚŽƌƚ-ƚĞƌŵŝƐƚ ?ŝŶŝƚƐŽƵƚůŽŽŬ and ambitions (Wilkes 
and Westlake, 2014; Berry, et al., 2016; Powell, 2014; Environment Audit Committee, 2016b; see 
Ingham, 1984 for historical critiques). From this perspective, the Treasury systematically fails to 
perceive the economic, social and/or environmental gains of long-term investments that might 
otherwise be possible through a development strategy targeting the broader productive economy, 
owing to its own narrow preconceptions concerning the appropriate form of economic policy and its 
reluctance to cede influence in this area to other departments.  
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There are, however, important exceptions to this tendency, namely where it concerns the defence 
manufacturing sector. This is highlighted by the  ‘ůŝďĞƌĂůŵŝůŝƚĂƌŝƐŵƚŚĞƐŝƐ ?, which charts very extensive 
forms of state-initiated and directed investment, restructuring and development in the military 
manufacturing sector stretching from the 18th century to the present (Edgerton, 1991; Coates, 2014; 
Lee, 1997). Britain, its proponents argue, developed a strategy for international hegemony premised 
on the intensive use of advanced military technologies, allowing it to maintain imperial pre-eminence 
despite possessing comparatively small standing armed forces. Liberal militarism continued to be 
pursued long after the loss of the empire, reflecting  ‘imperial mindset ? said to have infused elite 
decision-making across departments (Coates, 2014). Edgerton (1991) notes that during the 20th 
century the Treasury ?ƐƐƚĂŶĐĞŽŶ state support for particular military manufacturing industries became 
comparable to its hostile stance on civilian industrial policy only at the point that such industries ? 
relevance to liberal militarist strategy was superseded by new technologies.  
Whether ƚŚĞdƌĞĂƐƵƌǇ ?ƐĂĐƋƵŝĞƐĐĞŶĐĞƚŽůŝďĞƌĂůŵŝůŝƚĂƌŝƐŵ holds in the austere fiscal conditions of the 
post-2008 context is beyond the remit of this paper, yet its past existence highlights something of 
importance from the point of view of green development strategy: the Treasury ?ƐůŝďĞƌĂů dogmas and 
suspicions of other departments are not unqualified. Under certain conditions it has permitted the 
development of the kinds of capacities necessary to affect development strategies, albeit only in 
relation to particular sectors. This point invites a further question: what factors account for the 
formation and ordering of Treasury priorities, and under what (if any) conditions might these be so 
arranged as to lessen the likelihood that it will resist green development strategy? Alas, this is not a 
question that the literature is presently well equipped to address (although I offer some provisional 
reflections in the concluding section to guide future research). Instead, I focus here on demonstrating 
in greateƌĚĞƚĂŝůŚŽǁƚŚĞdƌĞĂƐƵƌǇ ?ƐŽƌŝĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĞŵĞrging environmental state in the 
post-2008 context demonstrates the enduring significance of Treasury control and the Treasury view 
that informs it.  
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Treasury Control and the British Environmental State 
Treasury control has proven a potent force in opposition to green development strategy in British 
post-2008 context, shaping and constraining the emerging form of the British environmental state. 
dŚĞdƌĞĂƐƵƌǇ ?Ɛ unwillingness to include the priorities of other departments in economic policymaking 
and its privileging of accumulation model repair has undermined such nascent green development 
strategy capacities that the British state has so far developed. A paradigmatic episode concerns the 
Green Investment Bank (GIB) and its subsequent privatisation in 2017. Ironically, the same emphasis 
on accumulation model repair that lies behind this episode has also seen the Treasury make 
encroachments into energy policy in ways that constitute an interventionist (albeit reparative rather 
than transformational) industrial strategy in and of itself  W albeit ŽŶĞƚŚĂƚŝƐĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚůǇ ‘ƵŶ-ŐƌĞĞŶ ? and 
focused on the oil and gas sector. In this section I explore these two issues in turn.  
The GIB was a publicly owned and capitalised but operationally independent investment bank founded 
by the coalition government of 2010-2015. A statutory mandate committed it to invest in 
infrastructure projects that promoted a variety of environmental policy goals, ĂŵŽŶŐƚŚĞŵƚŚĞh< ?Ɛ
commitments to carbon reduction. The GIB reflected a prominent view within the government that 
the re-ŽƌŝĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƉƌŝǀĂƚĞĐĂƉŝƚĂůƚŽƚŚĞƐĞĞŶĚƐŽŶĂƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƐĐĂůĞĂŶĚƉĂĐĞƚŽŵĞĞƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ?
emissions targets would require public leadership in capital allocation, and that this would in turn 
entail a public body with sufficient expertise and insulation from political pressures to be able to 
allocate capital over long time horizons (H.M. Government, 2011). The significance of the resulting 
institution lay in its departure from the historically prevailing tendency in British economic policy to 
indirectly privilege the centrality of the commercial financial sector: it represented an interventionist 
conduit through which state power could be exercised strategically to draw capital away from 
commercial financial activities and into the transformation of the productive economy. It reflected, in 
short, an emphasis on accumulation model transformation rather than repair. The fact that such a 
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novel departure should have also embodied environmental policy purposes suggests that green 
development strategy and the realisation of a more sustainable accumulation model was a real 
possibility in the post-2008 context.  
There are striking parallels between the story of the GIB and of the industrial modernisation agenda 
of the 1960s Labour government from which the DEA emerged. Both originated in moments of 
economic crisis and the mobilisation of disaffected social forces against the existing accumulation 
model (Ingham, 1984; Holmes, 2013). A coalition of environmentalist campaigning organisations, 
green goods producers and policy research organisations who favoured the idea of green 
development strategy were mobilised by the environmental consultancy firm E3G in order to 
capitalise upon political appetite for counter-cyclical stimulus measures during the recession of 2009 
(Holmes, 2013). Their key message was that the circumstances presented an opportunity for a  ‘ŐƌĞĞŶ
ƐƚŝŵƵůƵƐ ?, for which a state investment bank would be necessary. The idea was rapidly taken up by all 
three major political parties at the 2010 election, and was duly implemented by the Coalition 
government.  
Yet despite initial enthusiasm for the proposal from political parties, the institution (like the DEA 
before it) was soon subject to a crippling act Treasury control. The very rationale of the GIB dictated 
that it should leverage its public capital by accessing the capital markets. However, the Treasury 
resisted granting these borrowing powers, leading to a year-long standoff with the ministries 
responsible for industrial and energy policy. The stand-off became the object of newspaper intrigue 
as ministers from these departments appeared to brief against the Treasury (Guardian, 2010). In the 
2011 budget the Chancellor put a decisive end to the stand-off by announcing that the GIB would be 
ĚĞŶŝĞĚƚŚĞƉŽǁĞƌƐƚŽďŽƌƌŽǁƵŶƚŝůŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĚĞďƚǁĂƐĨĂůůŝŶŐĂƐĂƉĞƌĐĞŶƚĂŐĞŽĨ'W ?dŚĞ'/ ?ƐĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ
to be an investment bank was thus postponed until such a time as ƚŚĞ dƌĞĂƐƵƌǇ ?Ɛ ƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ŽĨ
accumulation model repair through regressive redistribution was brought to fruition. In the meantime, 
it would amount to little more than a funding agency. In 2015 it was announced that the GIB would 
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be privatised, on the basis that this would allow the bank to borrow (H.M. Government, 2016). Yet as 
ƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶ ?ƐEnvironmental Audit Committee (EAC) subsequently pointed out, this is an argument 
for privatisation only to the extent that opposition to granting the bank borrowing powers in the public 
sector is intractable (Environmental Audit Committee, 2016a).  
dŚĞŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƉƌŝǀĂƚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌƚŚĞ'/ ?ƐĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂůƉŽůŝĐǇŐŽĂůƐĂƌĞůŝŬĞůǇƚŽďĞƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂů ?
The '/ ?Ɛstatutory mandate was conceded to be incompatible with its re-classification as a private 
ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?/ŶƐƚĞĂĚ ?Ă ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĂůƐŚĂƌĞ ?ǁŝƚŚǀĞƚŽƉŽǁĞƌƐŽǀĞƌĐŚĂŶŐĞƐƚŽƚŚĞĂŶŬ ?ƐŐƌĞĞŶŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ
was created and granted to an independent trustee organisation. Even if this were to prove sufficient, 
there are reasons to be pessimistic about the scope for the privatised GIB to play a transformative 
role, for the simple reason that it is now subject market expectations of returns on investment and 
 ‘ƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌ ǀĂůƵĞ ?  ?ĂǀŽŝĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞƐĞhaving constituted the core rationale for a public financial 
institution in the first place). Market expectations are significantly higher than the 3.5% that the 
government had required of the institution (Engelen, 2012; E3G, 2015; Mabey, 2015). They feature 
prominently in narratives of the under-performance of productive investment in Britain, which is often 
riskier and less liquid than more lucrative unproductive financial activities (Engelen, 2012). Another 
formerly public financial institution  W 3i (formerly the Industrial and Commercial Finance Corporation) 
 W responded to market expectations by withdrawing from its previously mandated role of providing 
growth capital to small and medium-sized businesses, instead becoming increasingly involved with 
unproductive mergers and acquisitions activities. A similar logic will very likely drive the GIB away from 
lending on projects with long maturities and higher risk profiles, undermining its ability to support 
accumulation model transformation (E3G, 2015). 
The hamstringing an privatisation of the GIB represented a victory for the Treasury in asserting its 
control of the economic policy over the priorities of other departments and agencies. Ostensibly, these 
priorities appear to reflect the dƌĞĂƐƵƌǇ ?ƐĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƚŽ eliminating ƚŚĞ  ‘ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂůĚĞĨŝĐŝƚ ? PĂƚƚŚĞ 
time of the standoff, the government collectively maintained that Britain lay exposed to an impending 
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 ‘ĚĞďƚ ĐƌŝƐŝƐ ?necessitating fiscal austerity (Craig, 2015b). It was on this basis that the denial of 
borrowing powers to the GIB was justified. However, a straight-forward an equation of the 
ŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌ ?Ɛ rhetoric on the deficit with the actual Treasury view is dubious: elsewhere, the Treasury 
has been willing to sanction significant public investment in the productive economy in ways that are 
far from fiscally-neutral. Nowhere is this clearer than in the bank bailouts, which were excluded from 
the deficit target on the basis that the bond markets would tolerate such nuanced accounting 
procedures. The asymmetry in the treatment of these two kinds of public liability lends credence to 
the view that the Treasury regarded accumulation model transformation as lacking credibility, but was 
willing to commit significant amounts of public investment to accumulation model repair.  
Ŷ ĞǆĂŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ dƌĞĂƐƵƌǇ ?Ɛrecent incursions into energy policy support this more nuanced 
interpretation. That the Treasury placed small priority on curbing carbon emissions is evident in the 
conduct of fiscal policy  W shown, for example, in the counter-intuitive 2015 decision to subject 
ƌĞŶĞǁĂďůĞĞŶĞƌŐǇŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŽƌƐƚŽƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛprincipal carbon tax. The timing of this decision, coming soon 
after the election, suggests that the demise of coalition politics has bolstered Treasury control over 
energy policy by removing the need for concessions to coalition partners in other departments. 
Perhaps more significant for the purposes of this paper is the lightening on the tax burden on the oil 
and gas sector in the post-2008 context. One example is the suit of so-ĐĂůůĞĚ ‘ĨŝĞůĚĂůůŽǁĂŶĐĞƐ ?, which 
waive around 50% of the corporation tax of producers operating at those sites in the North Sea 
deemed strategically important. These allowances were worth around £3bn in the period between 
2012 and 2014 (Friends of the Earth, 2016). More controversially, the Treasury has extended this kind 
of support to the onshore extraction of shale gas. In 2013 a new allowance was announced which 
allows shale explorers to offset 75% of their capital expenditure against corporate tax.  
There is an obvious tension ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂů ĞŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƐ ƚĂƌŐĞƚ and policies incentivising 
investment in capital-intensive fossil fuel extraction industry. The advisory body overseeing these 
targets has stated that the most feasible and cost-effective path to achieve these overarching 
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emissions reductions commitments requires non-fossil fuel and/or carbon capture and storage-
equipped plant to constitute 75% of electricity generation by 2030, with the bulk of new investment 
oriented to renewables over the 2020s (Committee on Climate Change, 2015a). One is left with the 
impression that the Treasury doubts the necessity of rapid domestic decarbonisation, and instead 
orientates its policies towards a future in which such a transition occurs at a slower pace, if at all. 
By loosening the tax burden on fossil fuel extraction and generation, the Treasury makes deficit 
reduction more difficult in the short term. However, the move can be interpreted as supporting the 
broader project of repairing the existing accumulation model. TŚĞdƌĞĂƐƵƌǇ ?ƐƐƚĂƚĞĚŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞŝƐƚŽ P
 “ǁŚĞŶŵĂŬŝŶŐũƵĚŐĞŵĞŶƚƐĂďŽƵƚĨŝƐĐĂůƉŽůŝĐǇ ?ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƚŚĞǁŝĚĞƌĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐŽĨŽŝůĂŶĚŐĂƐ
ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶƚŽ ?ĨŝƐĐĂů ?ƌĞǀĞŶƵĞ ? ?, ?D ?dƌĞĂƐƵry, 2014, p.6). The industry is in fact of central 
importance to BritaŝŶ ?Ɛ ĂŝůŝŶŐ ĂĐĐƵŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ŵŽĚĞů ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ŝƚƐ ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ the balance of 
payments. A chronic current account deficit has been persistent feature of the model since the 1990s 
(ONS, 2016). Although a net energy importer, the domestic production of the oil and gas industry 
ŶĞǀĞƌƚŚĞůĞƐƐ ƌĞŵĂŝŶƐ Ă ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŽƌ ƚŽ ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ĐƵƌrent account, contributing an annual 
average of around £31bn to the balance of trade since 2008 (an amount not far short of the average 
trade deficit of £37bn)  ?ƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐĐĂůĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐďĂƐĞĚŽŶ Oil and Gas UK, 2009; 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; 
2014 and ONS, 2015, Table 1.1). With fossil fuels entrenched in the British transport and energy 
infrastructure, and with BriƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ŵĂŶƵĨĂĐƚƵƌŝŶŐ ĞǆƉŽƌƚ ƐĞĐƚŽƌ ŝŶcontinual stagnation, a domestic 
supply of fossil fuels is an important matter of macroeconomic composition  W all else equal, its absence 
would almost double the trade deficit. Thus, from a short-termist perspective that discounts the future 
costs of climate change there is a clear incentive to bolster the industry.  
Energy needs could in principle be met through renewable technologies. However, at present the 
extension of ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƉƌĞĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚůǇŶĂƚƵƌĂůgas-fired electricity generation infrastructure remains on 
average a more cost-competitive option (assuming that the resulting assets are allowed to work out 
their typically 30-year lifespan [DECC, 2011] and that the costs of climate change are excluded from 
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the analysis). Gas power has been central to British generation since its rapid expansion in the 1990s. 
ŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂůŝƐƚĐƌŝƚŝĐƐŚĂǀĞĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞdƌĞĂƐƵƌǇ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽŶĨŽƐƐŝůĨƵel taxation constitutes a 
parallel energy policy incentivising a second  ‘dash for gas ? (Powell, 2014). This much is quite coherent 
with the broader project of recovery through regressive redistribution: the technology requires fewer 
subsidies than renewable energy technologies in order to bring new capacity to fruition and remains, 
on average, the cheapest form of electricity to produce in Britain (BEIS, 2016).iii Because renewable 
energy plant subsidies in Britain are in large part financed by electricity consumers through their 
energy bills, a gas-centred strategy also equates to a lower burden on industrial and household income 
than would be the case if a more rapid transition to renewables were to be undertaken. This effect is 
ůŝŬĞůǇďŽůƐƚĞƌĞĚďǇƚŚĞ ?ŚŝŐŚůǇĐŽŶƚĞƐƚĞĚ ?ƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ŚĂƚĂ ‘ƐŚĂůĞŐĂƐƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶƌŝƚain might deliver 
falling gas prices on the scale seen in the US. A gas-based infrastructure allows in principle for these 
and the savings from recent falls in wholesale gas prices to be passed on to energy consumers and 
registered as lower general production costs and higher consumer spending. It therefore holds the 
potential to ĞĂƐĞƚŚĞĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂŶĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĐŽƐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞdƌĞĂƐƵƌǇ ?ƐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇŽĨĂĐĐƵŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶŵŽĚĞů
repair through regressive redistribution by supporting incomes and aggregate demand as public sector 
demand is withdrawn. 
dŚĞ dƌĞĂƐƵƌǇ ?Ɛ ŝŶĐƵƌƐŝŽŶƐ ŝŶƚŽ ĞŶĞƌŐǇ ƉŽůŝĐǇ ƚŚƵƐ ƐƵŐgest a willingness to sacrifice environmental 
policy commitments to a short-term goal of accumulation model repair. However, they also suggest a 
more nuanced interpretation of the Treasury view than one suggesting an inflexible economic 
liberalism: ironically, the forms of Treasury control in energy and environmental policy examined here 
amount to an extensive and interventionist industrial policy, albeit one oriented to accumulation 
model repair rather than transformation. Thus, for all of its historic antipathy to past attempts by 
public officials to steer the course of economic development in ways that reflect public purposes, the 
dƌĞĂƐƵƌǇĂƉƉĞĂƌƐƚŽŚĂǀĞŝƚƐĞůĨ ‘ƉŝĐŬĞĚĂǁŝŶŶĞƌ ?ŽŶƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐŽf its own strategic priorities: the oil and 
gas sector. 
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Conclusion 
An environmental state is one in which environmental policy becomes increasingly integrated with 
existing economic and social policy imperatives. Whilst the notion of  ‘ŐƌĞĞŶ ŐƌŽǁƚŚ ? ŝƐ ŚŝŐŚůǇ
controversial, contemporary capitalist accumulation models are a long way from achieving even 
 ‘ŐƌĞĞŶĞƌ ? growth. The practice of transformative green development strategy is thus a quantitative 
and qualitative indicator of environmental statehood. 
The political economy of green development strategy raises a whole host of issues that have not been 
touched upon in this paper, include issues of policy design, domestic coalition building, international 
coordination and reform of international institutions (on which see Craig, 2017). Yet a vitally important 
issue concerns the structure of each state: as the British case shows, the intra-state politics to which 
this gives rise can be as decisive a factor in shaping the scope for green development strategy as the 
struggle of social forces beyond the state. Treasury control will continue to constitute a potential veto 
point facing proponents of green development strategy for as long as the British state is organised in 
the way that it is. 
On the basis of this observation I make two reflections  W one methodological, the other prospective. 
In relation to the first, there is a need for environmental state researchers to continually engage with 
the particularity of individual environmental states. An analysis based predominantly on 
generalisation and abstract typology lacks the purchase on the strategic terrain necessary to 
understand how and why a given environmental state is developing in the way that it is, or to identify 
those factors that are stunting its development. Insofar as the environmental state literature aims to 
be relevant to promoting the processes of state transformation that it studies, it will be necessary for 
comparativist researchers to enter into continual dialogue with country-specific experts. 
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In relation to the second, a better understanding of the factors that structure formation and ordering 
of Treasury priorities (the  ‘Treasury view ?) is required if conditions favouring its more constructive 
engagement with green development strategy are to be specified. Further research is required, yet 
the literature does contain a number of promising leads. /ŶƐŽŵĞĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐ ?ƚŚĞdƌĞĂƐƵƌǇ ?ƐƉriorities 
are explained in terms of those of its senior personnel, principally the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
(Thain, 2014). Such accounts suggest that the interests of incumbent politicians and their attitudes 
towards the environment are a crucial factor constituting the Treasury view. A related perspective 
attends to the attitudes of Treasury officials (more traditionally thought of as the location of the 
Treasury view). In particular, it is sometimes pointed out that Treasury economists share a narrow 
orthodox intellectual background, suggesting that a greater penetration of heterodox economic (and 
perhaps even ecological) knowledge into the organisation might lead to the use of different models 
and decision-making frameworks (Green House, 2016). An alternative and more structural explanation 
instead emphasises the nature of the Treasury as an organisation, including its mandated functions 
and the traditions of practice and identity that are maintained there (Kerslake, 2017). In this 
perspective, ƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐŽĨƉŽůŝƚŝĐŝĂŶƐĂŶĚƚŚĞdƌĞĂƐƵƌǇ ?ƐƐƚĂĨĨĂƌĞůĞƐƐŝŵƉortant than the 
organisational context which they must navigate when performing their roles. From this perspective, 
the counter-productive exercise of Treasury control could be curbed if the Treasury was 
unambiguously mandated to pursue ecologically sustainable development, and then held to account 
for its successes and failings in this regard (Friends of the Earth, 2016). 
There is likely to be truth in all of these perspectives. Unravelling how these and other factors combine 
in the post-2008 context to reinforce the TƌĞĂƐƵƌǇ ?ƐƐŚŽƌƚ-termist prioritisation of accumulation model 
repair at the expense of green development strategy is an important task for researchers of the 
environmental state in Britain. Upon the answer to this question hinges the question of what reforms 
to the structure of the green development strategy implies. Advocates of accumulation model 
transformation continue to debate whether departmental rivals to the Treasury ought to be 
strengthened, or whether instead to preserve (or even extend) its mandate and deepen accountability 
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for the outcomes (cf. Wilkes and Westlake, 2014 and Berry et al. 2016). The latter option may appear 
paradoxical given the arguments made here. Yet, if nothing else, the Treasury has proven remarkably 
effective at accomplishing its economic policy priorities. To the extent that these can be brought into 
line with green development strategy there is at least a possibility that Treasury control could become 
a factor militating in favour of BritĂŝŶ ?Ɛ emerging environmental statehood. 
One of the first acts of the government of the Theresa May ?Ɛ government was to combine the energy 
and industry ministries into a single department: the department for Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy. It remains to be seen whether the combined department will prove a more effective counter-
weight to Treasury incursions into environmental and energy policy than its predecessors, especially 
amid the political and economic uncertainty that abounds in Britain at the time of writing (July 2018). 
Either way, the factors shaping the conduct of Treasury control represent more than an interesting 
oddity of British political development: they are pivotal to understanding the scope for greening the 
British accumulation model. 
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